October 2025 European Case Law Bulletin

Court of Justice - Various Cases

Case C-80/24 Zwrotybankowe.pl v Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Polski (9 October 2025) 

Principle Notion 

EU consumer credit rights can be freely assigned to third parties without breaching consumer protection rules, and courts are not obliged to review the fairness of such assignments unless directly disputed. 

Facts of the Case

• The dispute concerned a PKO Bank Polski S.A. (“PKO”) who had loaned to a Polish consumer. The consumer then assigned their right to claim compensation from PKO to the company Zwrotybankowe.pl sp. z o.o. (“Zwroty”). 

• The assignment agreement stipulated that the consumer would receive 50% of the recovered amount and the assignee would receive 50%. 

• The dispute: Zwroty claimed payment from the PKO. PKO argued that Zwroty lacked standing because such a transfer of rights undermined the purpose of EU consumer protection, since the claimant was now a commercial entity rather than a consumer. 

• This led to the District Court of Warsaw, Poland to submit two preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”): 

1. Whether Article 22(2) of the Directive 2008/48/EC which states that consumers may not waive the rights conferred to them, precludes national law? If so, then allowing the consumer to assign those rights to a third-party non-consumer. 

2. Whether Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC regarding unfair terms in consumer contracts, requires a national court to automatically, personally examine the fairness of a term in the assignment agreement, that is not presented before the court, where the assignee uses the assignment to bring a claim. 

Salient Issues

The CJEU had to establish: 

• Whether assigning consumer rights to a third party counts as waiving or losing those rights under EU law under Article 22, 

• Whether EU law requires national courts to examine the assignment agreement concluded by the consumer for unfair terms even when the contract is not directly challenged since the consumer is no longer a party to the litigation, and 

• The effectiveness of EU consumer protection when claims are sold or transferred and about national procedural rules permitting such transfers. 

Decision

On the First Question 

• The Court held that Article 22(2) of Directive 2008/48 does not preclude national legislation allowing a consumer to assign a claim, deriving from rights conferred under the national implementation of the directive, to a third party which is not itself a consumer. 

• Hence, EU law does not forbid a consumer from assigning their rights under the Consumer Credit Directive to a company or other non-consumer. 

On the Second Question 

• The Court held that Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13 do not require a national court, in proceedings between an assignee company and a seller or supplier, to examine of its own motion the fairness of a clause in the assignment agreement concluded by the consumer where that assignment agreement is not the subject matter of the dispute. 
  
   

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Case C-540/24 Cabris lnvestments v Revetas Capital Advisors 

Principle Notion

The case revolves around whether a jurisdiction-agreement clause concluded between two parties domiciled in a third country can still fall within the scope of the Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (“Brussels I bis”) – i.e., whether Article 25(1) still applies even when both parties are outside the EU. 

Facts of the Case

• Both Cabris Investments Ltd (“Cabris”) and Revetas Capital Advisors LLP (“Revetas”) were incorporated under English Law. 

• On 6 May 2020 the parties entered into a consultancy contract (with an accompanying letter) which contained a jurisdiction clause designating the Handelsgericht Wien as the exclusive court for disputes arising under or in connection with the agreement. 

• On 30 June 2023 Cabris Investments brought an action before the Austrian court seeking payment of EUR 360,000 plus default interest for a contractual obligation under that contract (role of CFO). 

• Revetas challenged the jurisdiction of the Austrian court arguing that the Brussels I bis Regulation (in particular Article 25) did not apply to legal relationships involving the UK after the end of the transition period of the UK’s withdrawal (31 December 2020) and hence the jurisdiction clause could not be assessed under Article 25. 

• The referring court posed three questions, inter alia: 
   

1. Whether Article 25 applies when both parties are domiciled in the same third State (the UK) and have agreed on the jurisdiction of a Member State’s court. 

2. Whether the fact that the clause was entered into during the UK’s Brexit transition period (but the action brought after the transition) affects the applicability of Article 25. 

3. Whether, if Article 25 does not apply, the Brussels Convention or other bilateral treaties might apply instead. 

Salient Issues 

The CJEU had to analyse: 

• The international element requirements under Brussels I bis of Article 25 related to third-state parties although they had agreed upon using courts of an EU Member State as having jurisdiction, 

• Whether a contract between two entities domiciled outside the EU contains a sufficient international element for the applicability of Brussels I bis, 

• Whether the post-Brexit status of the UK excludes the application of Brussels I bis to jurisdiction clauses agreed during the transition period but invoked in proceedings brought after the transition period ended, and 

• Whether, under EU law, the Austrian court (Handelsgericht Wien) could assume jurisdiction based on the clause designating it as the exclusive forum, despite both parties being UK-based. 

Decision 

The Court found that: 

• the mere fact that parties domiciled in the same third State agree on the jurisdiction of a court of an EU Member State is sufficient to constitute an international element, 

• article 25 of the Brussels I bis must be interpreted as covering a situation where both parties are domiciled in the same third State and the jurisdiction agreement designates a court of a Member State, even if the action is brought after the end of the transition period and the contract was made during the transition,  

• the fact that the UK is a third State and that proceedings were initiated after the transition period does not exclude the applicability of Article 25, given the wording and aims of the Regulation, and so 

• the referring court may rely on Article 25 Brussels I bis in declaring its jurisdiction on the basis of the jurisdiction clause, and so the clause is valid under that regime. 

This decision reinforces the party-autonomy principle in choice of court agreements under the Brussels I bis regime and underscores the objective of legal certainty and the uniform application of jurisdiction rules in the EU internal market context.  

 

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Case T-384/20 RENV OC v Commission  (1 October 2025) 

Principle Notion 

The case centres on the non-contractual liability of EU institutions, including the European Anti-Fraud Office (“OLAF”), which allegedly processed personal data improperly, breached the presumption of innocence and the right to good administration, and thereby triggered damage actionable under Article 340 TFEU. 

Facts of the Case 

• The applicant (“OC”) is a Greek national who submitted a research proposal to the European Research Council (“ERC”). On the 30th of September 2008, the Commission and a Greek university signed a grant agreement for the project, with OC as the lead researcher. 

• After the funds had been allocated, on the 5th of May 2020, OLAF had published press-release No.13/2020 which stated that their investigation had uncovered fraud, forgery and the use of forged documents by OC in relation to her research. Hence OLAF recommended the recovery of funds and national criminal proceedings. 

• A month later OC brought an action under Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation from the European Commission for non-material damage, including professional and reputational harm, allegedly caused by OLAF’s press release. 

• OC’s argument rested on the argument that OLAF via the Commission had: 

           a. processed OC’s data unlawfully, 
           b. violated the presumption of innocence and other principles of good administration
           c. failed in its duty of confidentiality and neutrality. 

• The Commission representing OLAF, argued that:  
  
  a. no personal data was disclosed in the press release and that an ‘average reader’ could not identify OC, 
  
  b. the publication of the report was in the public interest since there must be transparency in the disclosure of the allocation of EU Funds, 
  
  c. there was no violation of the presumption of innocence as no criminal guilt was asserted, and 
  
  d. there was no quantifiable harm or direct causal link between the press release and OC’s alleged reputational and health harm. 

Salient Issues 

The Court had to assess whether: 

• the press release at issue constituted processing of “personal data” of the applicant although she was not explicitly named, under Regulation 2018/1725, 

• the language in the press release used implied guilt, infringing OC’s right to the presumption of innocence and good administration under Articles 48 and 41 of the Convention of Human Rights, and 

• the three conditions for liability under Article 340(2) TFEU being unlawful conduct, damage and causal link, are satisfied and are sufficiently serious to evoke moral harm. 

Decision 

The General Court found that the three conditions for non-contractual liability were met being that: 

1. OLAF’s press release unlawfully processed personal data and violated the presumption of innocence and good administration, 

2. OC suffered non-material damage in her reputation, career and health, and 

3. there was a causal link between the unlawful conduct and the damage and ordered compensation of €50,000. 

This case strengthened personal data protection within EU institutions, provides analysis on EU non-contractual liability and reinforces institutional accountability. 

 

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Case C-110/24 STAS - IV v VAERSA 

Principle Notion 

This case concerns itself with interpreting Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC, known as the Working Time Directive, to determine if the time spent by a worker to get to and from the designated workplace, when using a company car, should be considered “Working time” 

Facts of the Case 

1. The Company VAERSA, whose majority capital is held in Spain, carries out improvement works in Natura 2000 areas. The company makes available to ‘Natura 2000 network staff’ a company vehicle that is to be used when travelling from the “base”, or a fixed point of departure chosen by VAERSA, to the worksite. 

2. Workers, part of the union STAS-IV, first travelled from their home to the base in their own vehicles, where then a company vehicle is provided to transport them to the designated site. 

3. VAERSA, although contractually not obliged to, does in practice count the time taken from base to worksite as actual working time. However, the company does not include the journey back (from worksite to base) as included in working time, which is the main dispute in these proceedings.  

4. The referring court cited a previous judgement, No 605/2020 of 7 July 2020, dealing with the same issues, whereby it was decided that if traveling to the worksite is essential for the business undertaking, which could not occur had the company not sent workers with the necessary tools, then the journey must be deemed as working time.  

5. The referring court posed the question: 

Does Article 2 of the Directive require that travel time in a company vehicle between an employer’s base and the work site, at the beginning and end of the working day, be treated as “working time”?  

Salient Issues 

The Court had to analyse and interpret: 

• The concept of working time and rest period, as these two classes are mutually exclusive. 

• Had to determine if such travel may be deemed as working time by meeting three cumulative conditions:  

1. The worker is working; 
2. The worker is at the company’s disposal; 
3. The worker is carrying out their activity or duty.  

Decision 

The Court found that: 

• Under Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC, time spent by workers travelling in the employer’s vehicle, at times and from places set by the employer, to and from the work site, qualifies as “working time.” 

• In the instances where the journey is intrinsically linked with the performance of their duties, travelling is to be included in ‘working time’. 

• The Court went on to cite Federación de Servicios Privados del sindicato Comisiones obreras, C266/14, where it was decided that due to the fact that the worker is to be physically present at a place determined by the employer, the employee is at the employer’s disposal. The worker is in an environment whereby he must obey the instructions of the employer. Thus satisfying all requirements of ‘working time’.  
  
   

  
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